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Studies of informal housing and urban citizenship in South Asia frequently link 
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negotiated and contested. Through an ethnography of access to electrical 
power in Islamabad, Pakistan, this article explores the pervasiveness of 
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state of pervasive predation and a collective imaginary which puts little 
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Introduction 
  
Securing access to infrastructure is a central theme in the 
considerations of precariousness and informality of the lives of the urban poor 
in the global south. This is most evident in the large – and growing – squatter 
settlements, where the absence of property ownership is typically grounds for 
denying basic services such as electricity to residents (Appadurai, 2002: 26-
27). The politics of squatter settlements are invariably bound up in their fight 
to secure those rights (Roy, 2009), neoliberal approaches to poverty reduction 
focus on how secure property rights enable economic growth (de Soto, 2000), 
and proposed relocations of squatters from urban centers offer secure tenure 
on compensatory plots as an incentive (Weinstein, 2014). This paper 
challenges the assumption that more formal rights are always better for the 
urban poor. Despite the fact that urban upper and middle classes almost 
always enjoy more secure property rights, it does not necessarily follow that 
the urban poor can improve their lot by transitioning to a formal rights-based 
engagement with the state. Why should a state with which the urban poor 
have inescapably conflictual relations (Watson, 2009), a state whose 
operations are a congealing of networks of power (Ferguson, 1990), welcome 
new claims on it from previously marginalized groups without resistance of its 
own? The cusp of formality is a boundary where processes of state formation 
are revealed (Mitchell, 1991). Formality is not an objective condition, but 
rather negotiated and contested (Schindler, 2014). On the basis that 
‘infrastructures are lived as contingent, power-laden, processes’ (Graham and 
McFarlane, 2014: 12), this paper considers formal and informal claim-making 
on the state in terms of the multiple levels on which infrastructures operate 
(Larkin, 2013).  
 This ethnography follows several analyses of infrastructure and 
citizenship that outline infrastructure’s often ‘splintering’ effects (Graham and 
Marvin, 2001) and the response of the urban poor across South Asia as they 
renegotiate infrastructural and property arrangements through a range of 
formal, informal, agitational and operational approaches (author withheld). A 
paradigmatic example comes from Chatterjee’s (2004) account of how a 
squatter settlement in Calcutta mobilized around a collective moral claim to 
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acquire shared electricity meters. Other forms of claim-making in this literature 
range from Benjamin’s (2008) depiction of street level bureaucracies as unruly 
spaces for subversive negotiation where the poor resist the imposition of 
capital, to Bayat’s (2013) ‘quiet encroachment’ which is not political but a 
silent and persistent redistribution of public goods in favor of ordinary people 
over the propertied. Anand (2011) describes a ‘hydraulic citizenship’ varying 
in proportion to the pressure that groups can exert on a dual socio-technical 
system of administrators and water infrastructure. Ranganathan (2014) 
presents a more subtle form of claims making with her account of how 
Bangalore’s lower middle classes voluntarily pay for expensive but 
unnecessary water infrastructure in an insurgent attempt to claim greater 
symbolic recognition and more secure land tenure from the state.  
The ample South Asian ethnographic literature on the politics of urban 
infrastructures is often critical of Chatterjee’s dichotomized division of claim-
making into two terrains of political and civil society. Chatterjee contrasts ‘the 
lofty political imaginary of popular sovereignty’ against ‘the mundane 
administrative reality of governmentality’ (2004: 36) in political society. Civil 
society is inhabited by middle and upper class elites, and is the domain of fully 
equal rights-bearing citizens as conceived in the Indian constitution. Political 
society is a condition of tenuous and ambiguous citizenship inhabited by the 
poor, including residents of squatter settlements. The debate over political 
society is a rich and textured account of the innovative and inventive ways 
that the urban poor secure their rights. By contrast, civil society is not 
conveyed through empirical examples, but rather remains more of a 
conceptual reference. Both in the literature and in the argument to be made in 
this paper, the realm of formal rights is weakly realised at best in people’s 
lived experience and their collective imagination.  
Informality is pervasive and not limited to Chatterjee’s political society. 
Ananya Roy takes up this point in arguing that ‘paralegality is a generalized 
condition,’ and thus the distinction between formal and informal which lies at 
the heart of the civil and political society dichotomy must be questioned (2015: 
344). The evidence from governance scholars painstakingly demonstrates 
that states routinely adopt formal structures as myth and ceremony (DiMaggio 
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and Powell, 1983) while retaining their existing – chiefly informal and 
paralegal – practices (Pritchett et al., 2013). Studies of the everyday state in 
India and elsewhere (Ismail, 2006; Blundo and Olivier de Sardan, 2006; 
Roitman, 2004; Fuller and Harriss, 2000) have provided rich evidence from 
across the global south on the informalities of the supposedly formal state.  
Ursula Rao’s careful ethnography of squatters who are resettled to an 
area where they have more secure formal rights attends to an important and 
rarely explored theme within this larger literature: that of the individual who 
successfully formalizes their previously informal existence. Rao describes 
how many of them fall victim to a scam and have their houses demolished; 
the former squatters had managed paralegality for decades, but were 
unhoused after resettlement with a more formal set of tenure rights. Rao 
notes that ‘Buying, selling, possessing or defending a plot is a condition of 
negotiation,’ and that the vulnerability of the resettled population was a 
function of their continued poverty (Rao, 2010).  
Interactions with the infrastructure of electrical power present a window 
on urban governance (Angelo and Hentschel, 2015). The urban bourgeoisie’s 
use of the same electrical power infrastructure is a necessary backdrop to 
understanding the experience of the urban poor. The urban poor in squatter 
settlements and those transitioning to formal status have to be understood as 
occupying the same urban world as the rich, whose own systematic 
informalities are so often ignored despite informality being ‘a routine tactic of 
the powerful’ (Tonkiss, 2013: 96-99). The informalities of the rich mirror the 
informalities of the poor in bringing social ties and power relations to bear on 
access to services (Tonkiss, 2013: 105-107). The prevalence of informality 
amongst the rich brings into question the validity on any conceived 
improvements to the life of the poor that might be achieved by transitioning to 
claim-making on the basis of formal rights.  
The ‘lofty political imaginary’ of civil society proposed by Chatterjee 
evokes the modern social imaginaries of Charles Taylor (2002). Taylor argues 
that the collective imaginary is shared, unlike theory and ideology which lie in 
the hands of a few. The imaginary is ‘not a set of ideas; rather it is what 
enables, through making sense of, the practices of society’ (91). The 
proposition that middle-class rights holders enjoy a set of practices of formal 
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claim-making which the poor are denied is at the heart of Chatterjee’s 
dichotomization, but there is also a distinct affective component which speaks 
to Larkin’s (2013) poetics of infrastructure. In looking at the experiences of 
formal rights holders in engaging the Pakistani state, I seek out the imaginary 
which informs how Pakistanis make sense of the practices of claim-making on 
the electrical power infrastructure.  
The next section introduces the field site of my ethnography in 
Islamabad, Pakistan. The paper proceeds to describe how residents of a 
squatter colony have historically obtained their electricity supply, as well as 
their orientation towards and attempts to obtain more formal rights. For 
comparison, the paper then considers the experience of Islamabad residents 
who have the formal rights sought by the squatter colony residents. The last 
two empirical sections look at the perspectives and experiences of formal 
rights holders, and then the experience of those few squatter colony residents 
who have attempted to transition to making claims based on formal rights. 
The paper concludes with a discussion of claim-making across the different 
styles and contexts, and challenges the assumption that the poor can 
necessarily benefit from a transition to making claims based on formal rights. 
An Ethnographic Study of Electricity in Islamabad 
The research for this article was part of an ongoing study consisting of 
about 18 months of active fieldwork across four years of residence in 
Islamabad, from 2008-2011. Islamabad is a planned city, the federal capital, 
and markedly less violent than the major metropolis of Karachi (See Gazdar 
and Mallah, 2013). The state, in various forms, is much more present than is 
the case in other Pakistani cities. State services in general are above 
average, electricity supply more regular, and residents have more personal 
connections to the state. By studying Islamabad one sees Pakistani state 
institutions at their highest level of effectiveness. If claim-making based on 
formal rights is going to work anywhere in Pakistan, it will be in Islamabad.  
The primary site for my ethnography was at multiple Sub-Division 
offices of the Islamabad Electric Supply Company (IESCO) where I followed 
the employees through all aspects of their work and observed their 
interactions with citizens who came to the office. The Sub-Division is the 
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lowest level of the IESCO organizational hierarchy and fulfills most of the 
public facing requirements concerning electricity supply including new 
connections, billing, maintenance, and disconnections. In addition to working 
with the IESCO employees, I interviewed and spent time among the residents 
of Islamabad in their capacity as electricity consumers, including from the 
katchi abadis such as 44 Quarter in Islamabad.1 
Islamabad has 34 katchi abadis, 11 of which are notified for 
regularization per the Punjab Katchi Abadi Act 1992. The criteria for 
regularization under the Act is that they had more than 40 households before 
23rd March, 1985. Regularization leads to a formal lease of the land and 
access to all state services for the occupants of the katchi abadi, but is not 
without some drawbacks. For the Capital Development Authority (CDA, the 
public agency which provides municipal services in Islamabad) to regularize 
the 44 Quarter katchi abadi where I did most of the fieldwork presented in this 
paper, regularization would involve planning the housing of the katchi abadi 
so that it would conform to building standards and thus contain fewer housing 
plots. Which households would not be accommodated, and where the surplus 
households would be relocated, are points of contention that have stalled the 
regularization process, since the proposed relocation site is much further from 
Islamabad. However so long as 44 Quarter is not regularized, the residents 
will be denied a document called a No Objection Certificate (NOC) which is 
issued by the CDA to certify that the applicant for the electricity connection is 
the legal owner of the land. Without an NOC, the residents of 44 Quarter 
cannot get legal connections. 
   
 
Mobilizing Collective Claims 
 One of my key informants in 44 Quarter is Liaqat, who, like almost all 
the residents of 44 Quarter, is Christian2. His home in 44 Quarter is a three 
storey brick and cement building which has not seen any new paint in some 
time. Liaqat and his wife and children live on the ground floor of their house, 
and other members of his extended family live on the upper two stories. The 
two rooms on the ground floor are a living room and a bedroom. The floor is 
bare cement. The ceiling is perhaps seven feet high and gives me a distinctly 
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claustrophobic feeling when I stand. There is a small fridge in the bedroom – 
that is the only visible appliance. Located in the middle of an affluent 
residential area, 44 Quarter is well-situated for access to employment and 
municipal services. The same electricity lines that serve the well-off 
neighborhoods run through 44 Quarter. For most of its history, 44 Quarter was 
served by undocumented connections (often termed electricity theft, or 
kunda). 
According to Liaqat, the type of theft occurring in katchi abadis in 
Islamabad occurs with the participation of the distribution company 
employees. Liaqat tells me that ‘The same money, instead of going to 
IESCO’s treasury went to police and IESCO staff.’3 Liaqat says that the 
distribution company employees were paid off to leave illegal connections 
alone, as were the police. Although I found no distribution company 
employees admitting to their participation in this specific case, many of them 
accepted such arrangements as being relatively common.  
Some 11 years prior to the time of this study, in 1998, 44 Quarter’s 
illegal connections were forcibly taken down in an army-backed intervention. 
The army’s role in power sector management came about at the invitation of 
the elected Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. In an admission of his government’s 
incompetence at public administration, which foreshadowed his own 
government’s removal in a coup the following year, Nawaz Sharif asked the 
Pakistan army to take over the management of electricity distribution 
companies in order to reduce theft. IESCO and the other distribution 
companies had serving army personnel assigned to them, including at senior 
management levels. The chief executives of the distribution companies were 
replaced by brigadiers on deputation from their usual military assignments.  
 The residents of 44 Quarter responded to the disconnection of their 
electricity supply by forming a committee to approach the brigadier in charge 
of IESCO. The gist of the argument they put to the brigadier was that if they 
were not allowed kunda connections, they should be allowed legal 
connections. My informants at 44 Quarter feel no qualms about the kunda 
connections. Liaqat tells me that ‘It’s our right [to electricity]. If you won’t give 
it to us, then we’ll take it like this.’ (‘Hamara right bunta hai. To aap nahin dain 
gain, to hum is taran lain gain.’)4 Another informant states that it is ‘inevitable, 
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in this heat,’5 that people will get electricity connections however they can. 
The 44 Quarter residents see electricity as something fundamental for decent 
living to which they too should have access, and their appeal to the brigadier 
was on largely humane rather than legalistic grounds.  
 The meeting of the 44 Quarter residents committee with the IESCO 
brigadier went well. The compromise reached by the parties was that 44 
Quarter would be served by a few documented meters, but that all the wiring 
and management of the system beyond the meters would be the responsibility 
of the residents.6 This decision served IESCO by ensuring that 44 Quarter 
residents would pay for their electricity consumption, and met the needs of 44 
Quarter residents by ensuring their electricity supply.  
The arrangements are distinctly an exception to the rules, which define 
a consumer as ‘a person or his successor-in-interest who purchases or 
receives electrical power for consumption and not for delivery or re-sale to 
others, including a person who owns or occupies a premise where electrical 
power is supplied’ (Islamabad Electric Supply Company, 2010: 4). The 
provision of electricity for delivery and resale to others is the job of a 
distribution company. The brigadier’s decision contravenes these rules, but 
IESCO’s consumer services manual limits service provision to applicants who 
can provide ‘ownership proof of the premises’ (Islamabad Electric Supply 
Company, 2010: 8) and thus cannot be provided to individual katchi abadi 
residents so long as the regularization process is incomplete. In the absence 
of NOCs and legal individual connections the committee representing 
residents of 44 Quarter accepted the compromise of communal metering. The 
residents of 44 Quarter would be allowed to a single communal connection at 
commercial rates (higher than domestic rates).  
The committee managed the process and the money for connecting 
the several hundred households of 44 Quarter to the communal meter. Shoaib 
was a member of that committee (he mentions that the brigadier was a ‘very 
nice person’7) and tells me that his inclusion was on the grounds that he is 
considered educated (purray-likhay). Shoaib lives in 44 Quarter and is 
employed by the residents’ committee to manage the billing and maintenance 
of the electrical system. He says: 
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The committee met for 2-3 days [prior to the negotiation with IESCO]. 
They formed a constitution for the committee (I asked to see this later 
in our conversation, he smiled and said that they made it once upon a 
time and that no one knew anything about it now).8  
The committee members are the respected elders (bozurg) of the community. 
Shoaib has in fact taken on many of the functions of the distribution company. 
He manages billing, collects the money, gives receipts, keeps records, and 
also handles maintenance of 44 Quarter’s electricity system. Shoaib does 
many of the same tasks a sub-division officer would. He also handles 
situations where there is difficulty in paying bills. 44 Quarter prints its own bills 
with instructions on the back for making payments. Paying in installments is 
not unusual, and sometimes the committee can reduce the bill somewhat. 
Strictly commercial arrangements are also not observed for churches and 
those individuals whom the committee deems needy and worthy of help. 
Instead, the moral underpinnings of the collective organization for service 
delivery are reflected in the departure from commercial logics. Each 
household is charged a fixed amount based on an assessment of the 
household’s consumption: 
I ask how they determine the charges for each household. Shoaib says 
he knows every house on every street. They are ‘like a family.’ He 
knows everyone's name, and his paternal grandfather’s (dada) name. 
We have no formality in going to each other's houses. Paying for extra 
facilities (fridge, a motor for pumping up water) costs up to extra 300 
per month.9 
Shoaib is confident that he knows the ins and outs of every household. His 
deep local knowledge is essential to keeping the communal system going.  
 The residents of 44 Quarter have mobilized on the basis of collective 
solidarity and make their claim for service delivery on a moral basis. They do 
not exercise purely commercial reasoning in determining how much each 
household must pay. Instead, assessments are based on Shoaib’s intimate 
knowledge of each household. Shoaib attributes his position to his good 
character and reputation.  
Imagining rights  
 Sharing of a common meter is also present in 75 Quarter and 50 
Quarter (two other katchi abadis in Islamabad where I interviewed residents), 
but their committees have been less scrupulous than Shoaib. Collection for 
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the municipal electricity bill is handled by a leadership committee comprised 
of katchi abadi residents. Neither in 75 Quarter nor in 50 Quarter was anyone 
able to explain how the current leaders obtained their position or describe 
what was entailed in being a 'leader.' Their inability to explain the nature of a 
leadership position suggests a lack of formalized process for selecting and 
changing leaders. Rates in 75 Quarter are higher than in 50 Quarter, but 50 
Quarter has accumulated arrears worth approximately two months of billing.10 
One resident of 75 Quarter suggested that members of the katchi abadi 
leadership committee were embezzling some of the money. Another informant 
chided me for being so naïve as to think that the 44 Quarter leaders were not 
also embezzling the committee funds. 
 Even in 44 Quarter, the communal system has not always worked out 
well. The communal meter must be put in someone’s name, which creates the 
opportunity for that person to take advantage of their position. Liaqat told me 
the following story based on 44 Quarter’s earlier experience with communal 
metering which predated the current solution: 
A committee of about 20 people got together to choose the person 
whose name the meter would be put in. ‘That man had not even a 
cycle to his name. He was a government employee (mullazim), went to 
work wearing slippers. Now he has cars. He’s become a big-shot 
(Choudhry bun giya hai).’  
‘This is Pakistan. (Yeh Pakistan hai). Who has money is king 
(badshah).’ 44 Quarter residents brought legal suits against him, but 
‘we’d talk and he’d use his money to get away free’11 
Liaqat sees how the communal system which now serves them well was once 
an opportunity for a member of their own community to exploit the residents of 
44 Quarter. In his eyes, the legal system offered them no recourse to justice 
against someone with substantial resources.  
 In their quest to formalize their land tenure rights and secure service 
delivery, the residents of 44 Quarter have engaged with various political 
actors in a very pragmatic manner. Liaqat tells me that ‘We’re not with any 
political party. We work with whoever is in power.’ Through their different 
contacts – activists, academics, politicians, and also foreign embassies – the 
katchi abadi dwellers bring to bear whatever pressure they can on the CDA to 
complete the regularization to which they are already committed. Liaqat 
proudly tells me of how the 44 Quarter residents secured a majority of votes 
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for the candidate they backed at their local polling station. The delivery of 
votes is an exchange for political representation in a purely transactional 
sense, as Chatterjee describes for political society, with no regard to party 
platforms.  
 The residents of the katchi abadis used the language of rights more 
than anyone else I spoke with in Pakistan. In the blunt terms of Liaqat ‘With a 
meter you get rights.’  
‘We’ve spend hundreds of thousands of rupees (lakhs) on our houses, 
but there’s no benefit. When you have rights, you benefit if you invest 
in your house. With a proper road you could get a car in. That would be 
very valuable.’  
After plotting only 300 houses would be possible. Some people would 
be moved way. The Capital Development Authority initially offered [the 
outskirts of Islamabad], but that is too far away. Each HH has 3-4 
earners to sustain it. Their jobs are in Islamabad, the commutes would 
cost too much. The Capital Development Authority board has the plan 
for approval. It’s almost done. (“Takriban tai ho giya hai.”) Liaqat thinks 
it will go through in a week.  
After plotting [regularization], everyone will get No-ObjectionCertificates. 
Each plot will have value. No problems with authorities in getting gas 
and electricity connections on our own.12 
Liaqat is conscious of the material benefits that can accrue from formal land 
title. He hopes that the shady dealings with state officials will cease. His 
approach is entirely consistent with neoliberal arguments for the importance of 
property rights which draw on Hernando de Soto (2000). Far from challenging 
the status quo structures of power and domination, it is a middle class 
aspiration.  
The katchi abadi residents have shown themselves more likely to 
internalize and perpetuate misrule rather than repurpose it in the form of 
insurgent citizenship. In some instances, katchi abadis leaders exploit 
institutional failures to extract rents of their own, adding one more obstacle to 
service delivery for the squatters. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the world of formal 
rights exemplified by a personal electricity connection takes on the 
appearance of an escape from these webs of exploitation and patronage. 
However, a more careful look at the experiences of those with established 
formal claims on electricity services exposes just how unreal the social 
imaginary of citizenship with recognized rights is.  
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‘This is Pakistan’ 
Focusing on the katchi abadi residents alone gives an incomplete 
picture of claim making on the electricity infrastructure of Islamabad. 
Examples taken from those who have more substantiated formal claims for 
service as well as more wealth, connections, and education reveal the 
tenuousness of formal claims and the pervasiveness of informality.  
 Industrial consumers are some of the most prized consumers for a 
distribution company as they are very easy to monitor and service. Zeeshan’s 
family owns an industrial facility in one of Islamabad’s industrial sectors, which 
he and his brother run. Zeeshan has a Masters in Business Administration 
from the United States and drives a very expensive car. His industrial facility 
is served by a legal connection, but even in this situation his experience is 
that the formality of the relationship is not relevant: 
‘To have a relationship (taluqat) with a government officer here means 
that you are giving them money. Nothing else (Bus.)’  
At every level they take money. To get a new connection you have to 
give money. Else you’ll wait 10 years. Since Pakistan was made, you 
have to pay to get work done. Everything’s foundation (bonyad) is 
money. They won’t do for you an unpermitted (najaiz) thing, but you 
have to pay for your rights.13 
Zeeshan’s view is that one’s rights may or may not exist on paper, but it is 
money which determines whether you can enjoy those rights. As an 
industrialist, Zeeshan’s main concern (along with cost) is the predictability of 
the electricity supply so that he can schedule his shifts, and it is on this topic 
that he meets regularly with the IESCO staff. He needs their cooperation for 
the success of his business, and in those relationships with IESCO officers he 
has to pay for the predictability of his supply. 
 My personal experience as an Islamabad resident also speaks to the 
nature of paralegality and the urban bourgeoisie. When the house I lived in 
developed some electrical problems I called the local sub-division office to 
register my complaint. I lived in an unremarkable suburban neighborhood 
where I rented the top half of a two-story house. The residents of this 
neighborhood were typically college graduates, professionals with good 
salaries, and relatively well off. After six attempts over three days, I 
succeeded in having an IESCO lineman come to my house to look at the 
electrical problems. He found a loose connection in my distribution box14 and 
Page 12 of 23
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/cus  Ruth.Harkin@glasgow.ac.uk
Urban Studies
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
 12
tightened it, but the problem reoccurred two days later. I then had the problem 
fixed by Bilal, an independent electrician, with whom I had the following 
exchange: 
Bilal: Everything after the meter is done by the electrician, everything 
before is IESCO's responsibility. We aren't allowed to touch it. If I had 
dropped my pliers and it had touched two wires then the transformer 
back there could have blown up.  
IN: I asked if he could do it and he said that it was my responsibility to 
arrange for it, but that he could do the work for me if I wanted.  
Bilal: He wanted to get some money from you. This is Pakistan. This is 
how things work here. Don't give him any money for this, or else he'll 
loosen it every time he goes by so that you'll call him and he can get a 
little more money for it.15 
The source of the fault is located in the distribution box. As Bilal states, that 
can only be attended to by the IESCO staff because any errors on Bilal’s part 
could have damaged equipment which served my neighbors as well as me. 
The lineman misinformed me in an effort to get some money from me. Bilal 
feared (rightly) that my naiveté would cost me money. Even though my 
relationship with IESCO is based on the formal rights of a contract for 
electricity supply, in practice those formal rules form the basis for transactions 
of favors, money, and power relations. To secure the electricity supply I 
needed, I employed a private contractor to do the work of the electricity 
company. The work was dangerous and completely against IESCO rules, but 
the alternative was to pay the IESCO lineman to do the same task in his 
personal capacity even though it was actually in his official job description. 
 Having a meter is by no means a complete solution to electricity woes 
as it opens up a new relationship with the distribution company based on the 
legal obligation to pay. The primary school next to the katchi abadi upgraded 
its electrical system and had a new meter installed, but the first bill was for an 
exorbitant amount because the new meter didn’t have a zero reading. The 
headmistress refused to bow to pressure from IESCO officers, who eventually 
dropped the matter without explanation. 16 Separately, IESCO officers 
describe government facilities such as schools, street lights, and water pumps 
as ‘parking lots’ for spurious charges through which they seek to offset losses 
incurred elsewhere – including theft in which they may be complicit. 
The school was able to see off the attempt at extortion from the 
distribution company employees, but without a resolution to the case there is 
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every chance that a future headmistress will have to respond to the same 
outstanding bill. Even for a government school – well established in the formal 
system – formal rights and an individual electricity meter are new 
opportunities for predation rather than a solution.  
 The school, the industrial facility, and my own encounters with the 
electricity utility all show the pervasiveness of informality even in the public 
sector, for wealthy businesspeople, and a relatively well off resident of a good 
neighborhood.  
The Challenging Transition to Formality 
 Unfortunately, many of the 44 Quarter residents who have succeeded 
in getting a toe-hold in the world of formal rights via an electricity meter in their 
name have come to regret it. Although IESCO’s compromise with the 
residents’ committee to provide electricity to 44 Quarter through communal 
metering is a functional solution (every household in 44 Quarter has 
electricity), it is viewed as second-best by the 44 Quarter residents. The 
communal arrangements notwithstanding, the 44 Quarter residents have 
continuously pushed to try and regularize their katchi abadi and secure the 
right to have individual meters for electricity supply. A local NGO has been at 
the forefront of these efforts, chiefly in engaging with politicians and activists 
in putting pressure on the CDA to complete the process in a timely manner. 
44 Quarter has been surveyed twice by the CDA. Households identified in the 
survey are noted by the CDA as residences with rights to municipal services. 
Liaqat tells me that for meters approved after the second survey, the demand 
notices (the distribution company’s equipment orders for the connection of 
new premises) were issued in five years later, and that it was 18 more months 
until the meters were finally installed. The money for these demand notices 
was given by a member of the National Assembly out of their official budget 
for development projects. Liaqat’s explanation for the delay is that the 
distribution company employees resisted because it would reduce their 
monthly earnings from the communal meters. Nonetheless, Liaqat and the 44 
Quarter residents’ fight for individual meters had partly been won by the time 
of our meetings. 
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As some individual meters were installed in 2009, 44 Quarter residents 
were told by an IESCO officer that they would regret it and that they would 
want the old shared meters back. That prediction was borne out in 44 Quarter 
in many cases. An individual meter can be a mixed blessing as it requires a 
greater degree of direct dealing with the distribution company. The buffer from 
a communal meter is gone, and so are the protections which come with it.  
The experience of having an individual meter for a house is described 
to me by Adam, a young man of about 21 who is working in a community 
based organization at 44 Quarter. Adam’s family had received an 
unreasonably large bill exceeding 10,000 rupees.  
IN: What happened in the [IESCO] office? 
Adam: The first man I went to see sent me to another one. The next 
one sent me to another one. He told me that there was no meter 
assigned to our house. I said then how are we getting a bill? He told us 
that they'll check it out. That they'll come and see if the meter is 
working properly. They said there's a leak in our house, that the 
electricity is being wasted. 
Liaqat: How can you have a leak with electricity? This isn't a gas pipe.  
Adam: They are taking the money from us in installments. And the next 
bill came to 7000. So we switched back to the shared meter, which is 
1200 per month. And now our bill from the meter - which we aren't 
using - is 75 rupees.  
N 
Adam: We aren't the only ones. Our neighbors have complained about 
high bills too.  
IN: There must be a form you have to fill in to complain about your 
meter. 
Adam: I don't know what form it is. They didn't give me any form.  
‘We aren’t educated enough’ (‘hum itnay purray likhay nahin hain’) that 
we can deal with IESCO.17  
Adam and his family were poorly equipped to handle the challenge of dealing 
with the state on its terms. Although Adam describes himself as insufficiently 
educated to deal with IESCO, he tells me that he passed his Matriculation 
(10th grade) and, in conversation with me, is reasonably confident and able to 
express himself. Nonetheless, the opacity of the process at the distribution 
company office and the behavior of the distribution company staff is enough to 
deter him. Adam tells me that his family is resigned to paying this bill that they 
cannot afford and did not incur. Their retreat to the communal system is a 
retreat to a system where they will be protected from state officials’ efforts at 
predation by Shoaib and the other committee members.  
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 A related experience to the abandonment of an individual electricity 
meter comes from some households from Islamabad katchi abadis who were 
relocated as a result of the regularization process. These families were given 
small plots of land in the residential sectors of Islamabad, including the 
relatively well-off area of F-10. These families took possession of the land, but 
most of them sold their properties and returned to katchi abadis in Islamabad 
(Rasool, 2010: 20).  
 The choice to sell the land to which they had formal title in order to 
return to katchi abadis throws a different perspective on the value of formal 
rights and also the state’s responsibility to continue to provide such 
regularization programs to katchi abadi residents. Matthew Hull (2012) reports 
a similar set of circumstances with villagers on the outskirts of Islamabad 
being compensated when they are relocated as a result of the city expanding, 
only to move to the next area where expansion will take place to seek out 
further compensation. The decision of the relocated katchi abadi residents to 
return to informality suggests that the program for their relocation was poorly 
conceived. On the other hand, these families were best placed to judge how 
to manage their resources, and their actions suggest that living with a cash 
windfall and returning to informality can be preferable to formal rights. In all 
the fieldwork and other interactions I had concerning electricity in Pakistan, 
the katchi abadi residents were the only people to regularly invoke a language 
of rights.  
 What are rights worth in this context? Formal rights seem to be worth 
very little. Claim-making on the state through formal channels is an exercise in 
frustration. Power relations (sometimes reduced to wealth) dominate 
proceedings, making it difficult to claim an entitlement regardless of the black 
letter law underlying the claim. The natural right to basic necessities is more 
compelling in achieving a compromise solution to the impasse between the 
electrical utility and the squatters who are prevented from formal access to a 
service they are ready and willing to pay for.  
 
Discussion and conclusion 
The phrase ‘this is Pakistan’ is inevitably followed by a view of the 
conditions of life in Pakistan, both in the katchi abadi and elsewhere, of a 
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Hobbesian state of nature where law offers little respite from a dog eat dog 
world. The social imaginary (Hall and Lamont, 2009) invoked is one in which 
dangers abound and must be navigated carefully. Formal rights are relevant 
in this collectively imagined Pakistan, but formal rights do not protect one nor 
are they on their own sufficient to secure access to crucial state services. 
Somewhat shockingly (given that Islamabad is Pakistan’s capital city), Paul 
Brass’ account of villages in Uttar Pradesh sums up the situation in Islamabad 
quite well: formal law is weak in the face of power relations, and there exists 
‘a set of formal rules and practices obeyed by a few, a set of informal rules 
and practices followed by most, and a lack of legitimacy attached to both’ 
(Brass, 1997: 273-279). The fact that claim-making based on formal rights is 
so ineffective in Islamabad implies that the challenges faced by 44 Quarter 
residents will only be worse in squatter colonies elsewhere, and suggests that 
the writ of the state is still remarkably weak even where it is strongest. 
Liaqat, who talked about securing rights through a meter, also says 
‘This is Pakistan. (Yeh Pakistan hai). Who has money is king (badshah)’ in the 
context of legal suits brought by 44 Quarter residents against an individual 
accused of embezzling the fees for a shared electricity meter. Liaqat 
described the lawsuits by saying ‘we’d talk and he’d use his money to get 
away free.’ In the collective imaginary of Pakistani citizenship articulated 
around access to electricity, outcomes in the formal justice sector can be 
bought and sold. 
At the other end of the social ladder from the katchi abadi residents, 
Zeeshan – the industrialist – states that you have to ‘pay for your rights,’ and 
that it has ever been thus since Pakistan’s founding. Zeeshan has all the 
advantages of wealth and power that one can imagine, and he uses them to 
secure his rights in terms of the access to electricity he needs to run his 
business. At my rented accommodation somewhere between these two 
points, the electrician repairing the electricity supply to my house invokes the 
phrase ‘This is Pakistan’ as a cautionary injunction against trusting the 
honesty of street-level bureaucrats. The shared imaginary invoked by the 
phrase ‘This is Pakistan’ is a harsh and hostile setting in which the state is just 
one more battleground. The people who invoke this phrase span all social 
settings and speak from personal experience. The idea of formal rights as 
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having much purchase is unsentimentally dismissed. Street-level bureaucrats 
will take advantage of naïveté, rights must be secured through payments, and 
the courts serve those who can buy justice. The shared web of meaning 
around the phrase ‘this is Pakistan’ constitutes an unsentimental and cruel 
imaginary (Taylor, 2002). 
In many respects, Chatterjee’s (2004) description of political society 
closely corresponds to the experience of 44 Quarter residents. The 44 
Quarter residents obtain a communal meter after meeting with the electrical 
utility and arguing that they are neither being allowed to steal electricity nor to 
pay for it. They describe access to electricity as a right, but the use of the 
word right (in English) is semantically vague and more moral than legal. The 
establishment of the squatter settlement as a moral community is reflected in 
how Liaqat describes his knowledge of the residents and his description of 
them being ‘like a family.’ The sentiment that underlies this claim is that the 44 
Quarter residents are human too, and to deny them electricity is unjust. The 
44 Quarter leadership is aware of their legal rights and actively pursues the 
regularization of their land tenure. They use their vote instrumentally and align 
themselves with such politicians as will support them. More recently, the 
Awami Worker’s Party won 3 seats in the 2015 local government elections in 
Islamabad by fielding candidates from katchi abadis, but this is not an 
insurgent movement in the sense of generating a ‘counter-politics that 
destabilizes the dominant regime of citizenship, renders it vulnerable, and 
defamiliarizes the coherence with which it usually presents itself to us’ 
(Holston, 2009: 15).  
The 44 Quarter residents who secure a personal meter merit further 
consideration because they have moved from the moral claim of the 
community in political society towards the individualized claims of civil society. 
Chatterjee does not discuss individual or communal movement from one 
terrain to another, but in 44 Quarter the transition to civil society is not 
straightforward for some. Engaging with the state with a contract on the basis 
of individual rights is also a contested and negotiated terrain, and very much 
subject to predation. That the electricity bill is the vehicle for this particular 
form of predation underscores how it is targeted at formal rights holders. To 
contest this predation requires a facility with bureaucracy (or power and 
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resources) that Adam and his family can’t muster. Their response, to retreat to 
the communal metering engagement, is driven by the assessment that they 
are better equipped to deal with the vagaries of a familiar informal system 
than the unfamiliar realm of formal rights. 
Formal rights and an individual electricity meter bring with them new 
opportunities for predation. This category of claim-making exposes distinct 
vulnerabilities because it is individually exercised. The poor are unlikely to 
manage these vulnerabilities successfully because they may be socially 
disadvantaged due to their minority status, lower levels of schooling, or lower 
incomes. The implication is that effective claim-making for the poor is more 
likely to be informal – such as the moral claims of political society or even 
through quiet encroachment. Even wealthier individuals, state actors, and 
businesses have reason to be wary of the predations of the state and put little 
stock in the protections of law. Local governance regimes are themselves 
highly resistant to rule based governance imposed on them from above, and 
also resist when it is imposed on them from below.  
Both among the residents of 44 Quarter and the international 
development agenda following de Soto, formal rights are assumed to be 
preferable to informal claim-making. The bourgeois urban residents have a 
greater degree of formal rights, and there is a palpable inequality in life 
chances which corresponds to the apparent availability of formal rather than 
informal modes of claim-making. But, as Zeeshan explains, when he does use 
his wealth influence the electricity bureaucracy, it is to ensure delivery on his 
formal claims rather than to have the street-level bureaucrats exceed their 
job-scope. Nonetheless, It is certainly the target of squatters to achieve formal 
status. State agencies, aided by development actors, both deny services to 
squatters on the basis that they do not own property and have formal 
documentation, and undertake reforms – at least on paper (Pritchett et al., 
2013) – to eliminate informality in their own ranks and in their engagement 
with the society around them. Yet as the examples in this article show, formal 
rights come with their own challenges that must be contested and negotiated. 
As Rao (2010: 413) observes, ‘Buying, selling, possessing or defending a plot 
is a condition of negotiation.’ The predation is of different varieties, but 
individuals and organizations in civil society are very much subject to 
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predation. After all, ‘this is Pakistan’ where predation is a universal condition. 
In political society, much of the work of resisting predation is managed 
through collective mobilization. Amongst the wealthy and middle classes, the 
work of managing predation is a more individual function. In both cases, these 
are contested and negotiated processes. Capital, personal networks, and 
education are key factors for dealing with the state for everyone – regards of 
the type of claim that they make. The transition to formal claim making may 
create new vulnerabilities for the poor and take away their most successful 
strategy for dealing with the state.  
 Engagement with the everyday state has great similarity for rich and 
poor alike in terms of process, though the impact of predation on the poor is of 
course much greater and it is much harder for them to negotiate those same 
processes. The desire for formal rights animates much of the engagement 
with the state in katchi abadis, but can be unrewarding for them when it is 
achieved. Formal rights do not end the practices of rent-seeking and 
personalistic relations which make up the encounter with the state. Where 
subordinate groups in katchi abadis have succeeded in achieving some level 
of service delivery, they have done so by internalizing many of the functions of 
the distribution company and organizing to deal collectively with public 
officials and elected representatives. 
 This study produced little evidence in support of an insurgent 
citizenship. Instead, the neoliberal logics of property rights were internalized 
by katchi abadi residents in their focus on formal rights. Misrule was more 
likely to be perpetuated than repurposed. Much as described by Chris Fuller 
and John Harriss in their introduction to the influential edited volume on the 
everyday state in India, ordinary people are ‘using the ‘system’ the best they 
can’ rather than resisting it (Fuller and Harriss, 2000: 25). The ideal-typical 
form of political society and its central dynamics were largely borne out in the 
examples of the urban poor of the global south explored here. However, civil 
society remained elusive in this study, and the holders of formal rights also 
described contestation and negotiation in securing the benefits of those rights 
while avoiding the predations of the state and others. The experience of those 
holding formal rights and the challenges faced by the squatters who 
attempted to transition to individual meters suggest a poorly understood 
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condition in which formal rights must be continuously secured through 
struggle. In this vision of the global south, a regime of formal rights is more 
illusionary than imagined. Even for those who have formal rights, there is no 
shared imaginary of how these might effectively translate to service delivery. 
The transition from being a squatter to holding and enjoying the benefits of 
formal rights is poorly understood, and is a worthy topic for further research 
on service delivery to the urban poor in the global south.  
 
                                                             
1 A katchi abadi is a squatter settlement. All individual and place names used here 
are pseudonyms. 
2 Christians constitute 1.59% of the total population of Pakistan. Katchi abadis in 
Islamabad are both Christian and Muslim. Without making any claims of 
representativeness, the analysis in this paper proceeds on the basis that the 
processes and power relations at work in 44 Quarter are not an artifact of the 
residents’ belonging to a religious minority. That view has been validated through 
fieldwork and accepted at presentations of this research at academic conferences in 
Pakistan and elsewhere. However, Pakistani Christians are undoubtedly a 
persecuted minority. 
3 Field notes March 19, 2010. 
4 Field notes March 19, 2010. 
5 Field notes July 28, 2010. 
6 While the distribution company’s responsibilities always end at the consumer’s 
meter, it is not usual for there to be anything other than household wiring at the other 
side. 
7 Field notes July 28, 2010. 
8 Field notes July 28, 2010. 
9 Field notes July 28, 2010. 
10 Field notes March 10, 2008.  
11 Field notes March 19, 2010. 
12 Field notes March 19, 2010. 
13 Field notes April 9, 2010.  
14 A distribution box is a junction point at which the electricity meter serving a home 
can be connected to the underground electric cables supplying a street. Islamabad is 
unique in Pakistan for its underground electricity supply.  
15 Field notes July 6, 2010. 
16 Field notes June 11, 2010. 
17 Field notes June 8, 2010 
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